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Abstract: We utilize optimization methods to determine equilibria of cryptocurrencies. A core
group, the wealthy, fears the loss of assets that can be seized by a government. Volatility may be
influenced by speculators. The wealthy must divide their assets between the home currency and the
cryptocurrency, while the government decides the probability of seizing a fraction the assets of this
group. We establish conditions for existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria. Also examined is the
separate timescale problem in which the government policy cannot be reversed, while the wealthy can
adjust their allocation in reaction to the government’s designation of probability.
Keywords: mathematical finance; game theory; cryptocurrency; optimization
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1. Introduction
Cryptocurrencies have evolved into a new speculative asset form that differs from others in that
most represent no intrinsic value; they cannot be redeemed by a financial institution for any
amount [1]. The roller-coaster ride of Bitcoin prices∗ from $6,000 to $20,000 back to $6,000, with
bounces in between, all during the period from October 2017 to July 2018, was shadowed by other
major cryptocurrencies [17]. This has been accompanied by the general feeling in government,
business and academia that the speculative fever is of concern only to those who own the
cryptocurrencies. There is some justification for this perspective as the total market capitalization of
all cryptocurrencies is now only about $131 billion, so that large moves in the cryptocurrency price
are not likely to have a significant impact on the world’s stock and bond markets. However, this
impact will present a significant risk to the world’s markets if the market capitalization of the
cryptocurrencies increases significantly. During the dramatic round trip of Bitcoin between $6,000 to
$20,000, the market capitalization of all cryptocurrencies nearly doubled in six months. Moreover,
∗
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10,000 Bitcoins were used to purchase two pizzas in the first transaction in 2010 [32]. If people
gradually become more comfortable with cryptocurrencies, as they did with internet shopping, it is
likely that the market capitalization could grow to a few percent of the $75 trillion Gross World
Product (GWP) as the fraction of the world’s savings that is under threat by government seizure, high
inflation, etc., is certainly at least this fraction (as discussed further below). At this point, large price
changes in cryptocurrencies would likely have an impact on the broader markets.
It is thus important to understand the factors behind the market capitalization and price of
cryptocurrencies. With all other assets there is some theoretical methodology to determine the value,
which is at least a first step estimating the trading price. For example, the value of a stock is assessed
by measures such as the expected dividend stream and other measures (see Graham [21, 22],
Luenberger [27], Bodie et al. [4], and Wolpert et. al. [39]). Even beyond these calculations, a
shareholder is de facto part owner of a corporation, and shareholders can – and do – collectively
exercise their rights assured by law. By contrast, a typical cryptocurrency does not assure the owner
of any rights. Furthermore, there is no corporate governance at all. The “miners and developers” –
whose names are usually not disclosed – get together and decide essentially on the supply (e.g., by
introducing a related cryptocurrency that they term a “fork”). Unlike corporate actions in which
shareholders can demand a vote, e.g., for directors via a proxy battle, it is not even clear which, if any,
nation’s laws apply. Thus, the absence of an intrinsic value of a cryptocurrency means that the usual
traditional finance methods, such as those introduced by Graham ( [21, 22]), are inapplicable.
Our analysis begins with a game theoretic examination of the motivations of three groups that are
the key players. For a core group, the basic need for a cryptocurrency arises from the inadequacy of
the home currency and banking system [33]. There are also a significant number of people who are
not able to obtain a credit card or even open a bank account in the US, for example [38]. In many
countries, owning large amounts of the currency can present a significant risk. There is the possibility
of expropriation by the government, sometimes in the guise of a corruption probe. The government
could institute policies in which inflation is very high, e.g., the extreme example in Venezuela [20]
where hyperinflation decimated any individual savings. Onerous taxes can be placed by the government
on the wealthy. Thus a group of people in the world have rational reasons to replace their country’s
currency with one that is outside the control of their government or financial institutions, even if it
presents some risk. Once it is transferred to cryptocurrency, they would have the option of buying
a more reliable currency or asset in another country. We denote this group by W (the “wealthy”).
Returning to the point made above, there is a substantial amount of the world’s wealth (including
individual’s whose assets are not large) that is in this situation. Many of these people, however, are
not yet comfortable with or knowledgeable about cryptocurrencies. As they feel more comfortable,
a greater fraction of this wealth may move into cryptocurrencies, inflating the market capitalization,
perhaps to a few percent of the world’s GWP.
The second group, D, represents a government that is totalitarian, at least with respect to monetary
policy, so that its citizens are not free to transfer their wealth into other, more reliable national
currencies. There is a probability, p, that the government can initiate policies that will deprive citizens
of a fraction k of their wealth, e.g., by printing money. This possibility is noted by the wealthy, W,
who must make a decision on the fraction of their assets, denoted 1 − x held in the home currency and
the remainder, x, in cryptocurrency, which presents risks of its own due to the volatility. The
government, D, exhibits risk aversion as with any financial entity. After all, its existence is dependent
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on obtaining funds from its citizens. A third group, S, consists of the speculators† whose sole reason
to trade is to profit from the transaction at the expense of the less knowledgeable group, W. In a
typical situation, the member of W is trading for the first or second time – having made their money
in another endeavor – while the speculators are professionals who have made thousands of trades, and
make their living at the expense of novice traders. The speculators effectively determine the volatility
(see Appendix). Note, however, that our analysis would be similar if the volatility were an exogenous
variable that is set arbitrarily. While D can set the probability, p, with which the assets can be seized,
group W can decide what fraction, x, to convert into the cryptocurrency.
We model this situation to find equilibria in two different ways. The first is to find the Nash
equilibrium [13, 18, 28, 29, 35] which is defined as the point (p∗ , x∗ ) such that neither party can
improve its fortunes by unilateral action. The underlying assumption is that both parties, W and D,
are aware of the situation faced by the other, so that they can simultaneously self-optimize while
assuming that the other party does likewise.
In a later section, we utilize the more realistic assumption that while W can make immediate
changes (e.g., one day), D must make a decision that is irrevocable during a longer time (e.g., one
year) as policies (e.g., creating inflation, imposing onerous taxes) are implemented. But in doing so,
D must be aware that W will self-optimize in its choice of x, knowing p. Thus, both parties are aware
of the different time scales involved in anticipating the other party’s decision.
The methods we present in this paper are aimed at determining the demand using optimization. The
investors of the cryptocurrency do not have any clear idea how much is the right amount to pay per unit
of the cryptocurrency, so that the demand will determine the trading price as discussed in Appendix
A and [9]. In a setting in which there is one cryptocurrency with a fixed supply, the price will be
determined as
Demand in Dollars
Equilibrium Trading Price =
.
(1.1)
Number of Units
Analogous methodology can be utilized for multiple cryptocurrencies.
One might be led to examining cryptocurrencies in the context of monetary policy, but the
terminology “currency” is the main similarity between the cryptocurrencies and the US Dollar, Euro,
Yen, etc. The differences are profound‡ . Major currencies are established by governments within a
well-defined process that is governed by law. The identities of those who are responsible for monetary
policy are known. The citizens of the country can influence the representatives who appoint the
monetary officials. Finally, if the citizens feel that the direction of monetary policy is not in their
interest, they can elect new representatives. There have been many currencies throughout the world,
and it is no accident that the most viable currencies have been those of the countries with the most
respect for the law and the voices of their citizens.
Thus, the theory of monetary policy will be of limited use in the understanding today’s
cryptocurrencies. The aspect of our analysis that is closest to monetary policy involves the actions of
the government, D, which must make a decision on issues such as generating inflation (see,
e.g., [2, 3]). Of course, the government in our analysis is one that is very different from the major
democratic governments that have the more reliable currencies.
†

In commodities such as gold and oil, there are producers and industrial users who must trade. In cryptocurrencies, there are no end
users other than W who are trade infrequently, unlike industrial users for gold, for example, who are perpetually trading.
‡
This point is probably clear to anyone who bought Bitcoin at $20, 000 and sold it at $6, 000 several months later.
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Since the widespread use of cryptocurrencies is a fairly new phenomenon, the literature is also
recent. Many papers have focussed on the blockchain technology and its potential for increased speed
and safety of transactions. The introduction of JP Morgan’s JPM Coin (see Appendix A) is an
example of utilization of this technology without any new economic issues, since JPM Coin would be
redeemable in US Dollars. The economics of cryptocurrencies have been discussed in terms of legal
issues [24], valuation [15], security issues [5, 16] and stability [7, 23, 26, 30] and feasibility [12].
Experiments have also been used to study cryptocurrencies and related issues [14, 19].
Our analysis can be viewed in the more general setting of an asset that is easily traded and out
of the reach of the state and other entities. However, the popularity of cryptocurrencies may indicate
that there are not so many of these. Traditionally, gold has been used as a haven, but it is not always
easy to prevent theft. Nevertheless, followers have often noted spikes in gold when there is political
uncertainty in the highly populated and less developed countries. Also, the demand for gold depends
upon other factors such as industrial use.
2. The utility functions of the groups
The general framework for this section will be to write the utility functions of the three groups,
modeled on portfolio theory [27], [4] whereby one seeks allocate resources to maximize return while
minimizing risk. The general form for a basic utility function is U = m − d2 σ2 where m and σ2 are the
expectation and variance of the outcome, while the parameter d2 quantifies the risk aversion.
The speculators, S, are assumed to have an influence on the volatility and risk. Even if they had no
influence on the volatility, they are likely to profit at the expense of W, who are likely to be novices
(as discussed above). Hence, the role of S is secondary (and discussed in the Appendix) as they create
an expected loss and a variance for W.
Focusing now on the groups, W and D, we assume that W has a choice between the home
currency, F, and a cryptocurrency, Y. Any money held in F faces the risk that a fixed fraction k ∈ [0, 1]
will be seized by D with probability p. Thus, the outcome will be (1 − x) (1 − k) with probability p
and 1 with probability 1 − p. Letting mF and σ2F denote the mean and variance of the investment in F,
one finds,
mF = (1 − k) p + 1 · (1 − p) = 1 − kp,
σ2F = k2 p (1 − p) .

(2.1)

For the investment in Y, we let mY and σ2Y denote the mean and variance that may be determined by the
speculators (see Appendices B and C).
The utility function for W with the fraction x ∈ [0, 1] of its assets in Y and the remainder in F can
then be expressed as
U W = m − d 2 σ2
= xmY + (1 − x) mF
n
o
− d2 x2 σ2Y + (1 − x)2 σ2F + 2x (1 − x) Cov [Y, F] .

(2.2)

We will assume that the correlation between the two assets, Y and F, is zero, but the analysis can easily
be carried out if there is a correlation.
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The utility function for D can be expressed in terms of the amount that it seizes, i.e.,
U D = (1 − x) kp.

(2.3)

This can be augmented with a term (as in portfolio theory) that expresses the risk aversion. In particular,
one has
U D = (1 − x) kp − dD2 p2 ,

(2.4)

where dD2 represents the risk aversion of D.
3. Nash equilibria
We assume the utility functions described in Section 3, using the risk aversion form of U D above
(2.4) . Thus, we need to find (p∗ , x∗ ) such that
∂ x UW (p∗ , x∗ ) = 0, ∂ p U D (p∗ , x∗ ) = 0,
∂ xx UW (p∗ , x∗ ) ≤ 0, ∂ pp U D (p∗ , x∗ ) ≤ 0 .
i.e., (p∗ , x∗ ) satisfies the definition of a Nash equilibrium (see e.g., [18, 28]). Briefly, the definition
ensures that at (p∗ , x∗ ) neither party can unilaterally improve its situation. We compute
0 = ∂ p U D (p, x) = (1 − x) k − 2dD2 p,

(3.1)



0 = ∂ x UW (p, x) = mY − mF + 2d2 σ2F − 2d2 σ2Y + σ2F x


= mY − 1 + kp + 2d2 k2 p (1 − p) − 2d2 σ2Y + k2 p (1 − p) x.

(3.2)

Denote the solution of (3.1) by x1 (p) and that of (3.2) by x2 (p) , so that
2dD2 p
x1 (p) = 1 −
k

x2 (p) =
=

(3.3)

 −1
σ2F + 2d2 (mY − mF )
σ2F + σ2Y
 −1
k2 p (1 − p) + 2d2 (mY − 1 + kp)
k2 p (1 − p) + σ2Y

.

(3.4)

The intersection of x1 (p) and x2 (p) determine a Nash equilibrium. We first establish sufficient
conditions for at most one equilibrium, and then prove that under broad conditions, there exists a Nash
equilibrium. Some of these curves for sample values of the parameters are illustrated in Figure 1.
AIMS Mathematics
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Figure 1. Selected curves modeling the fraction x of wealth to be placed into cryptocurrency
from the perspectives of groups D and W. The linear curves represent the optimization for
d2
D and the others for W. We plot the curves for values of a := 2 kD = 8, 4, 2 against fraction
under seizure k and expected loss/trading cost on cryptocurrency b := 1 − mY given by
(k, b) = (.5, .7) , (.55, .85) , (.6, .9) , (.75, .95) (starting from the upper left curve) with volatility
c := σ2Y = 0.1 and group W’s risk tolerance d = 1 both held constant in both sets of curves.
When there is an intersection in the range (p∗ , x∗ ) ∈ (0, 1)2 , we have a Nash equilibrium. It
is possible to have other intersections outside of this box, but such ”equilibria” are irrelevant
and their behavior will lead to boundary cases such as p = 0 or p = 1.
Theorem 1. For p ∈ [0, 1/2] one has x20 (p) ≥ 0 for all values of the parameters, so there can be at
most one value of p such that x1 (p) = x2 (p), and thus at most one Nash equilibrium for p ∈ [0, 1/2].
 −1
 −1
Proof. For convenience set f (p) = k2 p (1 − p) , c1 = 2d2 (1 − mY ) , c2 = 2d2 k and c3 = σ2Y so
that
f (p) + c2 p − c1
x2 (p) =
f (p) + c3
and

c2 k2 p2 + c2 c3 + (c1 + c3 ) k2 (1 − 2p)
.


f (p) + c3 2

(3.5)

Clearly, for p ∈ [0, 1/2] all terms are positive and the conclusion follows.



x20 (p) =

Theorem 2. If the parameters d, k and mY satisfy


c1 + c3 ≤ c2 i.e., 1 + 2d2 (1 − mY ) ≤ k
AIMS Mathematics
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then x20 (p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [0, 1] . Thus there can be at most one Nash equilibrium under these
conditions.
Proof. For p ∈ [0, 1/2] the result has been established. For p ∈ [1/2, 1] the numerator of (3.5) is
c2 k2 p2 + c2 c3 + c2 k2 (1 − 2p) = c2 c3 + c2 k2 (1 − p)2 > 0,


and the result follows.

Having determined sufficient conditions for uniqueness, we now focus on establishing existence of
Nash equilibrium. Note first that the p−intercept of x1 (p) can be on either side of x = 1 depending on

−1
and consider the two cases separately.
the slope −2dD2 /k. In particular, we let pc := k 2dD2

−1
Theorem 3. (a) If pc := k 2dD2
< 1 and
 −1
k2 pc (1 − pc ) + 2d2 (mY − 1 + pc k) > 0,
(3.7)
then one has a Nash equilibrium, i.e., there exists (p∗ , x∗ ) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] such that x1 (p∗ ) = x2 (p∗ ) =
x∗ .

−1
(b) If pc := k 2dD2
≥ 1 and
 −1
2d2 (mY − 1 + k) 2dD2
+
≥1
k
σ2Y
then one has again a Nash equilibrium.
If in addition, equation (3.6) holds, then the Nash equilibrium (p∗ , x∗ ) is unique.
Proof. Recall that mY ≤ 1. Thus, we have the inequality,


1 = x1 (0) > 0 ≥ x2 (0) = (mY − 1) / 2d2 σ2Y .
We use the Intermediate Value Theorem to establish an intersection between x1 (p) and x2 (p) in the
unit square in (p, x) space.

−1
Case (a) . Suppose pc := k 2dD2
< 1. Then
 −1
k2 pc (1 − pc ) + 2d2 (mY − 1 + pc k)
x2 (pc ) =
k2 pc (1 − pc ) + σ2Y
so that by (3.7) one has x2 (pc ) ≥ 0 = x1 (pc ). Thus there exists an intersection of x1 (p) and x2 (p) at


(p∗ , x∗ ) ∈ [0, 0] × pc , x (pc ) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] .

−1
Case (b) . Suppose pc := k 2dD2
> 1. Then x1 (1) > 0, and x1 (p) ∈ [0, 1] for p ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, an intersection of x1 (p) and x2 (p) for p ∈ [0, 1] must occur on the unit square provided that
x2 (1) ≥ x1 (1) . Then the required condition is
 −1
2d2 (mY − 1 + k)
x2 (1) =
σ2Y
2d2
≥ 1 − D = x1 (1) .
k
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Remark 4. The Nash equilibrium may not be unique if the condition above, i.e.,


1 + 2d2 (1 − mY ) ≤ k
of Theorem 3 is violated. An example for two Nash equilibria can be constructed with the parameters:
k = 0.7, mY = 0.8, d = 2, dD = 0.355, σ2Y = 0.1.
The two equilibria are given approximately by (p∗ , x∗ ) = (0.88, 0.68) and (0.96, 0.65), as displayed in
Figure 2.

Figure 2. Under certain combinations of parameters, for example k = 0.7, b = 0.8, d =
2, dD = .355, and σ2Y = 0.1, we can have two Nash equilibria. The eventual steady-state of
the solution would depend on where the initial conditions lie with respect to these two points.
4. Equilibrium with disparate time scales
We consider the situation in which the wealthy, W, can decide on an allocation x immediately,
(e.g., within one day), and adjust to the probability, p, while D must set p that cannot be changed for a
long time e.g., one year. Thus, D lacks the opportunity to react to the value of x. Both parties are aware
of the position of the other group. Hence, D knows that once he sets p, group W will set x = x̂ (p)
in a way that optimizes UW , and that W does not need to be concerned with any readjustment of p in
reaction to their choice of x. Thus, D must examine UW (based on the publicly available information
on the volatility of Y) and decide on a value of p that will optimize U D (p, x̂ (p)) . Within this setting
the utility of D need not be strictly convex in order for an interior maximum (i.e. such that 0 < p < 1
and 0 < x < 1). Thus, we consider the case in which D has utility that is proportional to the amount it
takes, without any risk aversion, which can be included with a bit more calculation.
AIMS Mathematics
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We define the quantity
A := 2d2 σ2Y + 1 − mY

(4.1)

which arises naturally in the calculations and is a measure of the risk and expected loss from Y. Thus a
higher value of A means Y is less attractive to the wealthy.
Theorem 5. Suppose that the utility functions, UW and U D , given by
U D = (1 − x) kp
U W = m − d 2 σ2
n
o
= xmY + (1 − x) mF − d2 x2 σ2Y + (1 − x)2 σ2F + 2x (1 − x) Cov [Y, F] .
are known to both parties. Assume that D sets p irrevocably to maximize U D , while W chooses x to
maximize UW based on a knowledge of p. For 0 ≤ A < k the optimal choice of x given p is
σ2F
mY − m F

+ 2
x̂ (p) :=
σY + σ2F
2d2 σ2Y + σ2F

(4.2)

with mY and σ2F given by (2.1) , and the optimal value of p is given by
s

2


σ
A
Y
 1 +
 .
(k
−
A)
−
1
p∗ :=

k (k − A) 
σ2Y

(4.3)

Thus the optimal point is (p, x) = (p∗ , x̂ (p∗ )) . The value of maximum, x∗ = x̂ (p) is 0 if the right hand
side of (4.2) is negative, and 1 if the right hand side exceeds 1.
Remark 6. Note that given p the optimal fraction of assets in the cryptocurrency is a sum of the
relative variance of the home currency, i.e., σ2F as a fraction of σ2Y + σ2F plus the difference in expected
loss from the home currency, i.e., 1−mF minus the expected loss from the cryptocurrency, 1−mY scaled
by a risk aversion factor. Thus the fraction invested in the cryptocurrency increases as the expected
loss and the variance of the home currency increases, and conversely.
Remark 7. Note that one obtains an interior maximum with a linear utility function for U D in this type
of optimization, i.e., even though D is interested in pure maximization of its revenue.
Proof. Using (2.2) we determine the maximum of UW for a fixed p, so that


0 = ∂ x UW (p, x) = mY − mF + 2d2 σ2Y − 2d2 σ2Y + σ2F x.


Noting that ∂ xx UW (p, x) = −2d2 σ2Y + σ2F < 0 we see that U D is maximized by x̂ (p) given by (4.2)
provided x̂ (p) ∈ [0, 1]. In the following two cases the maximum is on the boundary:
mY − mF
+ σ2F < 0 implies x̂ (p) = 0,
2
2d
mY − mF
+ σ2F > 1 implies x̂ (p) = 1.
2
2d
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Thus, x̂ (p) interpolates between 0 and 1 by favoring Y if the relative risk of F (measured by
−1

is large in comparison with the relatively greater expected loss in Y (scaled by the
σ2F σ2Y + σ2F
sum of the variances).
In anticipation, D optimizes U D (p, x (p)) . We thus compute, with B := σ2Y ,
2d2
Ap − kp2
∂ p U D (p, x (p)) = ∂ p
k
B + k2 p (1 − p)
h
i 
h
i
(A − 2kp) B + k2 p (1 − p) − Ap − k2 p k2 (1 − 2p)
=
.


B + k2 p (1 − p) 2

0 =

This identity is equivalent to
Q (p) := AB − 2Bkp + k2 (A − k) p2 = 0.

(4.4)

Note that A > 0 by assumption. The positive root of equation (4.4) is
r



A
B
∗
p =
 1 + (k − A) − 1 .
k (k − A)
B
One can verify that p∗ ∈ [0, 1], and conclude that (p∗ , x∗ ) = (p∗ , x̂ (p∗ )) is the optimal point.



Remark 8. Case A = 0. By definition (4.1) we see that 1 − mY = 0. Note that p∗ = 0 follows from the
identity above. Using the definition and the computed values of mF = 1 − kp and σ2F = k2 p (1 − p) we
write
k2 p (1 − p)
mY − 1 + kp

+ 2
σY + k2 p (1 − p)
2d2 σ2Y + k2 p (1 − p)
mY − 1
x̂ (0) =
= 0.
2d2 σ2Y

x̂ (p) =

In other words, when A = 0 there is no risk and no expected loss in the cryptocurrency. Thus, D
realizes that any nonzero value of p will result in W investing nothing in the home currency, F.
Case A = k. The quadratic numerator (4.4) is then Q (p) = AB − 2Bkp so that one has p∗ =
 1/2.
1
Case k < A ≤ 2k. By considering a small positive perturbation, δ, of A we see that Q 2 > 0 so
that the positive region of ∂ p U D is extended toward the right as A increases.
Case A ≥ 2k. Since p ≤ 1 one has
Q (p) ≥ B (A − 2k) + k2 p2 (A − k) > 0,
so ∂ p U D > 0 and the maximum is thus p∗ = 1.
5. Conclusion
We have examined the optimal strategies for the key parties (those with savings at risk, a
dictatorial government and speculators) involved explicitly or implicitly in the formation of an
AIMS Mathematics
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equilibrium for cryptocurrencies. The second method involves different time scales in determining
equilbrium that differs from the more common Nash equilibrium, in which all parties can readjust
their positions continuously. As described in Section 4 this can be utilized for many realistic
situations in which one entity such as a government optimizes by placing conditions such as taxes,
tariffs, fees, etc., or policies that cannot be reversed or adjusted in a short time. In general,
optimization in this form favors the group that can make immediate and continuous adjustments.
Each of the methods are based on parameters that can be estimated. For example, the variance of
cryptocurrencies can be determined from the trading data. Parameters such as k (the fraction of assets
seized) can be estimated from the policies of the government. An assessment of these quantities then
leads to estimates of the amount of money that is likely to be used to purchase cryptocurrencies in
the aggregate. Using the ideas summarized in [9] one can then also evaluate average price changes of
cryptocurrencies as well as the total market capitalization of cryptocurrencies. The evolution of the
latter is crucial in understanding the implications of instability of cryptocurrencies on other sectors of
the world’s economy.
Major governments have often appeared confused and lethargic in their response to cryptocurrency
policy, even insofar as deciding whether it is important or not. There is also little understanding of
the conditions under which a cryptocurrency could be either beneficial or detrimental to global society.
The perspective of our paper suggests that a cryptocurrency price will vary widely depending on the
demand that in turn is based on policies of countries where monetary policy and laws, in general are
less developed. Together with the fact that cryptocurrencies cannot be redeemed for any asset, one
cannot expect much stability. However, given a mechanism whereby a cryptocurrency is essentially
backed by real assets (e.g., a structure similar to Exchange Traded Funds) one would have stability
since arbitrageurs would take advantage of any discrepanicies. This could be linked of course to a
single currency such as the US Dollar, but would only be a trading token in this case.
However, one can design a cryptocurrency that would essentially grow with the world’s economy,
unlike a commodity such as gold. A simple example would be that the cryptocurrency could be
reedemable in units of the Gross World Product in terms of a basket of major currencies, so that each
cryptocurrency could be redeemed for one trillionth of the GWP in Dollars, Euros and Yen. Such an
instrument would offer much greater stability and could be used as a substitute currency that is
independent of any government. As shown in our analysis, as the volatility risk would diminish, and
those whose assets in the home currency are at risk would place more of their assets into this
cryptocurrency. Thus the fraction, x, placed in the cryptocurrency would increase. In particular, the
equilibrium point (p∗ , x∗ ) would feature x∗ that is larger and p∗ that is smaller. This would mean that
the citizens have greater economic freedom, and financially totalitarian regimes would have smaller
resources. In summary, the creation of a viable cryptocurrency with intrinsic value would have less
volatility, and thereby reduce the fraction of savings in the home currency that is under threat by a
totalitarian government, whose existence is often contingent on raising money in this manner.
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30. M. Okur, Ö. Çatıkkaş and P. Kaya, Long Memory in the Volatility of Selected Cryptocurrencies:
Bitcoin, Ethereum and Ripple, Preprint, 2018.
31. D. P. Porter and V. L. Smith, Stock market bubbles in the laboratory, Applied mathematical finance,
1 (1994), 111–128.
32. R. Price, Someone in 2010 bought 2 pizzas with 10,000 bitcoins - which today would be worth
$100 million, 2017. Available from:
http://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-pizza-10000-100-million-2017-11.
33. K. Rapoza, Struggling nations think cryptocurrencies will save them, Forbes, 2018. Available
from:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2018/02/26/struggling-nations-think
-cryptocurrencies-will-save-them/#3b4605a47da6.
34. O. Romanchenko, O. Shemetkova, V. Piatanova, et al. Approach of Estimation of the Fair Value
of Assets on a Cryptocurrency Market, The 2018 International Conference on Digital Science (pp.
245–253), Springer, Cham, 2018.
AIMS Mathematics

Volume 4, Issue 3, 420–436.

433

35. V. Smith, Bargaining and market behavior: essays in experimental economics, Cambridge
University Press, 2005.
36. V. L. Smith, G. L. Suchanek and A. W. Williams, Bubbles, crashes, and endogenous expectations
in experimental spot asset markets, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, (1988),
1119–1151.
37. O. Schlotmann, S. Ulreich and I. Zippe, Bitcoin: Quo Vadis? a Forecast Based on Estimated
Production Costs and Investor Preferences, 2018. Available from:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3291543 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3291543.
38. G. White, The millions of Americans without bank accounts, The Atlantic, 2017. Available from:
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/fdic-underbanked-cfpb
/504881/.
39. D. H. Wolpert, M. Harre, E. Olbrich, et al. Hysteresis effects of changing the parameters of
noncooperative games, Phys. Rev. E, 85 (2012), 036102.
40. K. Wu, S. Wheatley and D. Sornette, Classification of cryptocurrency coins and tokens by the
dynamics of their market capitalizations, Roy. Soc. Open Sci., 5 (2018), 180381.
41. K. Wu, Financial Markets in Natural Experiments, Field Experiments, Lab Experiments and Real
Life, Doctoral dissertation, ETH Zurich, 2018.
A. Appendix A: Fundamental Value and Liquidity Value
There is a temptation to stipulate that the only valuation of an asset is the trading price, as this
price reflects the preferences and values of the buyers and sellers via the intersection of the supply
and demand curves. In principle there is nothing wrong with this perspective except that important
phenomena are left unexplained, and significant risks are mischaracterized as rare or low risk.
One way to examine different aspects of price or value is through the laboratory experiments such
as the “bubbles” experiments introduced by [36] in which an asset pays a dividend with expectation
24 cents at the end of each of 15 periods, and is then worthless. The value of this asset at the end of
Period k is clearly given in dollars by
Pa := 3.60 − (0.24) k.

(A.1)

In numerous experiments, prices often started well below Pa in (A.1) and soared far above this
fundamental value, and eventually crashed. This persisted even in experiments in which the dividend
payout had no randomness at all [31]. It seems difficult to deny that Pa is a meaningful and useful
quantity, particularly since it is a quantity that the trader can be assured of receiving. For example,
purchasing at a trading price early in the experiment that is often below Pa ensures the trader will gain
a specific profit. If one ignores the intrinsic value, Pa , one would conclude that the risk is the same at
any price, and likely incur a large loss during the course of the experiment. Also, it has been
noted [8], that in these experiments, there is a third quantity with units of price per share. This is the
“liquidity value,” L, defined as the ratio of the sum of all cash in the experiment divided by the total of
all shares. Experiments that were designed to test this concept [10, 11] showed that the liquidity value
has a primary role in determining the size of the bubble. In fact the peak of the bubble was often close
to L. In other words, when traders pay little attention to fundamental value, or if the fundamental
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value is not clear, the price drifts toward the liquidity value [8]. At the opposite extreme, for short
term government bonds, the calculation of fundamental value is clear, as the owner is assured of a
particular sum at a particular time a few months in the future. The trading price generally trades very
close to this fundamental value since there are many arbitrageurs who exploit any deviations.
The vast majority of cryptocurrencies do not have any redemption value, they pay no dividends, and
they do not endow holders with voting power over an entity with assets (as do stocks, for example).
Thus, classical finance calculations involving expected dividends, book value, replacement value, etc.,
all yield a fundamental value of zero. One exception is JP Morgan’s JPM Coin, announced in February
2019 which would be redeemable in US dollars. The redemption price would yield the guaranteed
value, which would be Pa , the fundamental value, so long as the investors are confident in JP Morgan’s
ability to fulfil its commitment.
Ignoring fundamental or intrinsic value often leads to disastrous practical results, as investors
discovered with the internet stocks in 1999, or the Japanese market in 1990, for example, when
standard calculations of stock value [21, 22] showed a large discrepancy between the trading price and
the fundamental value.
Similarly, in theoretical development, neglecting either the fundamental value, Pa , or the liquidity
value, L, will have the same consequencefs as overlooking any other important quantity in modeling
economics problems. One obtains some results that are not consistent with observations, and has no
way to rectify the situation.
Although one cannot calculate a positive Pa for the typical cryptocurrency, people are paying for
these units, so that they must see some value in it. The perspective that fundamental value must be
the trading price, renders the equivalence a tautology. As discussed above, a consequence of this
perspective is that important phenomena are left unexplained, and an even a basic understanding of the
likely price evolution becomes more difficult.
Since cryptocurrencies have no fundamental value, prices will naturally drift toward the liquidity
value, which will be given by the total amount of cash available for the cryptocurrency (i.e., demand)
divided by the number of units [10, 11].
The absence of a non-zero fundamental value means that price will be set by the supply (which is
fixed, for example, for Bitcoin) and demand in accordance with equation (1.1). Thus it is a calculation
of demand that is key to understanding equilibrium price.
B. Appendix B: The roles of speculators and market-makers
1. We consider first the role of “pure” speculators who have no control of the type of trading or
auction, the rules of the exchange, the enforcement of the rules, the display of orders, and the flow
of information. Volatility arises endogenously due to the various trading strategies, such as trend
following, and random events that motivate any of the traders. For many first time or novice traders,
there is a tendency to overreact, chase a trend, or hop onto a fad. In the case of cryptocurrencies,
which lack any fundamental value, any news is likely to result in an overreaction. Thus volatility can
be expected to be high in the absence of any anchor. For example, Treasury bills offer a guaranteed
payout, so that a small deviation from the certain payout due within a few months would be exploited
by arbitrageurs and the price would be restored close to its intrinsic value. The speculators in many
markets have a better understanding (compared to novice traders) of the factors that move prices within
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a short time scale. Speculators are generally believed to lower volatility [6], as they use their capital
to buy when prices move unjustifyably lower. Of course, when prices exhibit very low volatility, there
is no financial incentive for speculators to trade. Consequently, in an idealized setting, the short-term
volatility level will be established as the minimum value at which speculators find adequate profits
after costs.
2. Next we consider “speculators” in less established markets in which the rule makers, market
makers, news makers are all essentially the same group. In most developed markets such as the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and major commodity exchanges there are precise rules designed to
promote fairness and ease of trading that have been developed over many years. An example is the
NYSE rule that if there are two orders to purchase a stock, it is the higher one that prevails.
Surprisingly to novice traders, this is not usually a feature of most markets. In many markets there are
“market makers” who are entitled to buy the stock for their own account at a lower price, even though
a higher bid has been placed by a retail customer or trader. The rules of each exchange endow the
market makers and market specialists with the power to buy and sell on their own account. In many
well-developed exchanges, there are rules agains “front-running” whereby insiders buy on their own
accounts as they become aware of a set of large orders that are entering the market. Another example
on major exchanges involves “not held” trades that are placed with the market makers but are not
displayed. The intention here is that a large order to sell could prompt further selling by less informed
traders. By contrast, in a less developed market environment, a market insider can place a large order
(but above the market price) that will immediately lead to lower prices, whereupon he can deftly
purchase.
Novice traders usually make numerous assumptions relating to fairness on the nature of market
rules and procedures. Unfortunately, these are generally false for less developed markets that cater
to inexperienced traders. The wishful thinking of new traders seeking quick riches (or escape from
a currency) provides for a healthy income for those dominating these markets in terms of making
the rules (if there are any at all) and using their capital to control the volatility. For many of the
cryptocurrencies, for example, it is not even clear what the rules are, or where they would be enforced.
Thus, in an under-developed market, a group of participants that controls the rules of trading has
numerous tools at its disposal to adjust volatility. Even the hours of trading have a strong impact on
volatility. For example, it is well-known that trading around the clock leads to times periods of low
volume so that a few trades can move prices much more than during actively traded times. On the other
hand, in an exchange in which there is a single trade each day at a specified time, the maximum minus
minimum price within one week is likely to be much lower than in 24 hour trading.
3. Another feature that can influence prices is the extent to which information on orders is displayed.
The “order book” displays the array of bids and asks for the asset in continuous time. Whether or not
the order book is displayed depends upon the rules of the exchange. Also, on some exchanges, the
market maker can choose to display only some of the orders. In laboratory experiments [11] it was
shown that bubbles are tempered by the display of the complete order book.
Related to the order book are the rules under which the market maker can buy for his own account.
While “front running” – the practice of buying for one’s own account ahead of a large order – or
“shadowing” – buying the same assets as a particular trader – are banned in some of the most developed
exchanges, one cannot assume that they will be prohibited universally.
Of course, all of this assumes that there is a real market in which bids and asks are matched with
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some rule. In many cases purchases and sales are made through one entity that buys and sells for its
own account, thereby granting itself a generous profit as the middleman. Even in large brokerages it is
common for monthly statements to disclose “we make a market in this stock” that indicates the bid/ask
spread is whatever the company designates as revenue for itself. From the perspective of the individual
trader, the bid/ask spread, of course, adds to the cost and volatility of the transaction.
C. Appendix C
In examining the choice faced by W we assume that one option is to remain in the home currency,
F, and the other to buy the cryptocurrency with the objective of later selling in order to buy other assets
such as a more reliable currency, gold, etc.
The group W experiences a loss or gain on these transactions with the speculators, group S, which
itself has a non-linear utility function reflecting that fact that high volatility is good for profits up to a
point after which it has a negative impact. Thus, one has the following utility function for group S:
US = a1 V − a2 V 2
where V represents the volatility or variance, for example, and a1 , a2 are positive constants. Hence,
there will be a maximum value V = Vm that maximizes the utility of the speculators. This can be
viewed as a fixed quantity from the perspective of W.
The mean, mY , and variance, σ2Y of group W’s investments in Y can be calculated based on Vm and
the other parameters that describe the trading. In particular, we assume that there is a probability q
(presumably small) that W will profit, and that their wealth will increase from 1 to 1 + r1 Vm and a
probability 1 − q that it will decrease from 1 to 1 − r2 Vm where r2 > r1 > 0. In other words, there is
a small probabilty, q, that W will benefit by r1 Vm (as a fraction of their original wealth) and a larger
probability, 1 − q, that they will lose a larger sum r2 Vm . The loss is proportional to the volatility as
the professional speculators are able to exploit the ups and downs of the trading at the expense of the
inexperienced W.
The mean and variance of the outcome are then
mY = q (1 + r1 Vm ) + (1 − q) (1 − r2 Vm ) ,
σ2Y = q (1 − q) (r1 + r2 ) Vm .
In other words, there is large probability that W will take a loss on the transaction. One can consider
more general probability distributions for W’s profits and losses, but ultimately, the two quantities
that are relevant for its utility function UW are given by mY and σ2Y that one can regard as empirical
observables.
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